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Chapter Twenty-One 
Agrarian Reform and “Development” 
Anna Cant 
INTRODUCTION 
Land struggles generated political conflict across the Andes for much of the twentieth century. 
Indigenous communities had suffered the steady encroachment of their land under both colonial 
and republican rule and, in many cases, were forced to retreat to the most inhospitable highland 
territory. Large amounts of land were concentrated in the hands of a small number of large es-
tates, known as latifundios, while huge numbers of peasants survived through subsistence farm-
ing of small plots, known as minifundios. Unequal access to land formed the basis for broader 
social inequalities as landowning elites used their economic power to dictate the terms of trade, 
water access, labour rights and political representation. 
From the mid-twentieth century onwards, the status quo was challenged from various directions. 
Governments of different political persuasions engaged in innovative projects of agrarian reform 
to modernise their economies and respond to peasant movements. While many agrarian reforms 
fell short of realising their modernising objectives, they had long-lasting consequences for the 
distribution of political power and the citizenship status of indigenous and peasant populations.  
THE LAND PROBLEM 
Postcolonial legacies of land inequality 
During the pre-Hispanic era, diverse regional cultures developed in what is now Peru. These cul-
tures generally combined family occupation of the land with collective tenancy and labour, al-
beit with important regional variations. Resources were distributed to allow local self-sufficiency 
and the accumulation of a surplus that could be used as tribute for local chiefs. The expansion 
of the Inca Empire during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries led to the develop-
ment of agriculture and the centralisation of tribute, a system that the Spanish sought to appro-
priate (Matos Mar and Mejía, 1980, p.17). As a reward for participating in the 1532 invasion, 
some early settlers were granted an encomienda by the Spanish Crown, which gave them rights 
to the tribute and labour of the subjects of certain indigenous chiefs, or caciques. Access to 
labour and tribute was more valuable to the settlers than land ownership at this point. However, 
the encomienda system collapsed around thirty years after the Spanish invasion due to massive 
demographic decline in the indigenous population and a simultaneous increase in the settler 
population and its consumption needs. By the late sixteenth century, the conquest society that 
lived off tribute from indigenous producers had shifted to a colonial society that was directly 
involved in the production process (Keith, 1976). The central productive unit in this new colonial 
society was the hacienda, an agricultural estate producing goods that could be traded on local 
and international markets. With the emergence of the hacienda, land ownership became much 
more significant since the land itself formed the basis of the settlers’ wealth. 
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During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the lands occupied by indigenous communities 
(known as ayllus in the Andean region) were increasingly absorbed by the haciendas, which were 
consolidating their position in the colonial economy as they expanded. Spanish settlers used a 
combination of coercion, negotiation and force to extend their territorial reach. As Brooke Lar-
son (1998, p.76) comments in the case of the Cochabamba valley (in what is now Bolivia), “Of-
ten hidden from the public eye and from royal scrutiny, a host of land transactions took place in 
the 1560s, amounting to a piecemeal, de facto, and often ostensibly peaceful territorial ad-
vance.” While Spanish settlers commonly provided explanations for natives’ willingness to sell 
their land, it is difficult to know the extent to which indigenous landowners actively chose to 
sell as part of an economic strategy, such as investing in pack animals (Larson, 1998, p.76). For-
mer communal lands also became vacant because of the disintegration and dislocation of indige-
nous communities due to disease and political breakdown, as well as the colonial reorganisation 
of dispersed indigenous populations into reducciones (concentrated settlements) as part of the 
Toledan reforms that began in 1567 (Matos Mar and Mejía, 1980, p.19). 
By the eighteenth century, the dominance of the hacienda within Andean rural economies meant 
that many indigenous populations were dependent on the large landowners for their livelihood 
and were subjected to conditions of servitude, particularly in the traditional highland regions of 
Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. Despite peasant protests, this situation persisted and in some cases 
worsened throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The contract signed by the 
tenants of the Hacienda Huyro in La Convención (Cusco, Peru) in 1900 is illustrative in this re-
gard. Among other conditions, the contract obliged the tenant to pay rent in both cash and 
labour; maintain his tenancy for a compulsory five years; work on the hacienda for one month 
out of every three in return for 40 cents per day in wages; consume only items produced by the 
hacienda, such as sugar and aguardiente (an alcoholic beverage) or face a fine; and give prefer-
ence to the hacienda in selling goods produced on his plot of land.   i
The human cost of this highly unequal balance of power is made clear in the personal testimony 
of individuals such as Saturnino Huillca, a Quechua-speaking peasant who was born in the de-
partment of Cusco and endured decades of abuse at the hands of hacendados before becoming a 
prominent peasant leader. In the 1970s he recalled “they have made us work without compas-
sion. Because they did not consider whether I had strength. Whether I was fed or not. The im-
portant thing for them was for me to work even in that situation. And they worked me like a 
beast” (Neira Samanez, 1975, pp.14-15).  ii
Winds of change 
By the mid-twentieth century a variety of circumstances coincided to make the status quo seem 
untenable. Beginning in the 1930s, peasants in Peru’s southern highlands organised peasant 
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unions to contest their labour conditions and used land occupations to force landowners to nego-
tiate. In the early 1960s these protests grew in scale and impact. Writing in 1964 as a special 
correspondent for the national newspaper Expreso, Hugo Neira observed that the land occupa-
tions sweeping across the southern highlands were neither the result of spontaneous protests nor 
the work of the “usual suspects”—communist, Trotskyite agitators. “Let us not fool ourselves,” 
wrote Neira, “beneath the old poncho, amid an apparently traditional or routine picture, these 
people have learned and they have changed. [Peasant] unionism is a mutation. The spark that 
can ignite all of the sierra” (Neira, 2008, p.79).  
In response to the growth in peasant activism, even traditionally conservative newspapers such 
as La Prensa called for greater attention to the land question and the implementation of agrari-
an reform. Following the occupation of Hacienda Chaupimayo in Cusco in 1962—which brought 
the hacienda’s economic activities to a halt and made national headlines—an editorial in La 
Prensa commented: “[T]he solution has to consist in the immediate expropriation of the latifun-
dio, at a just price according to the existing law, and in the execution of an exemplary agrarian 
programme that not only distributes land among the campesinos [peasants] but that also orien-
tates them and helps them to free themselves from the misery and ignorance in which commu-
nism prospers.”  In the case of Bolivia, the strength of peasant activism forced the Revolutioniii -
ary Nationalist Movement (MNR) to make agrarian reform a central part of its government pro-
gramme when previously it had only been discussed in vague, general terms (Dunkerley, 1984, p.
65). 
Rural inequality was also catapulted onto the political agenda by the emergence of Cuban-in-
spired guerrilla organisations. In 1965 three distinct political organisations (Ejército de Lib-
eración Nacional, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria and Frente de Izquierda Revolucionar-
ia) attempted to initiate armed struggle against the Peruvian state using guerrilla tactics, such 
as attacking police posts and blowing up bridges and communications lines. Following the unex-
pected success of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, it was felt across Latin America that contrary to 
traditional Marxist doctrine, the rural poor could form the basis of a political revolution against 
the capitalist state. Peru’s guerrilla organisations were drawn primarily from middle class uni-
versity students who were filled with idealism but lacked practical knowledge of the sierra and 
the peasant communities that they sought to mobilise. All three organisations suffered a re-
sounding defeat at the hands of the armed forces and were disbanded following widespread ar-
rests and loss of life (Béjar, 1970). Nevertheless, the fact that Cuban tactics of armed struggle 
had been adopted within Peru was a cause of grave concern for the government and reinforced 
the argument that the threat of rural insurgency could only be defeated in the long term 
through fundamental social and economic reform.  
This argument received substantial support from the U.S. government, which was keen to re-
strict the growth of communism and promote the development of capitalist economic systems 
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within its immediate sphere of influence. President John F. Kennedy established a policy known 
as the Alliance for Progress, which provided aid to Latin American nations for the implementa-
tion of land reform, agricultural credit and the introduction of new technology. Among the aims 
agreed by the Alliance members was a commitment “to encourage, in accordance with the char-
acteristics of each country, programmes of comprehensive agrarian reform” (Sklar and Hagen, 
1972). 
From an economic standpoint, by the early 1960s it was apparent that in most of the Andean na-
tions the agricultural sector was in desperate need of modernisation. High levels of poverty in 
rural areas and low levels of agricultural productivity were key factors used to explain the re-
gion’s slow progress in reaching the levels of industrialisation already achieved in “the West.”  In 
the case of Peru, agricultural production failed to keep pace with the country’s rapid demo-
graphic growth and the development occurring in other economic sectors. The annual growth 
rate of Peruvian agriculture fell from an average of 3.8% between 1950 and 1963, to just 1.9% 
between 1964 and 1968. This situation gave rise to high levels of unemployment in rural areas 
(in 1969 just 33.8% of the agricultural labour force was in permanent employment) and wide-
spread migration from rural to urban areas. Unable to accommodate the sudden influx of peo-
ple, many cities saw the rapid development of shanty towns and so-called poverty belts (cintur-
ones de pobreza) (Matos Mar and Mejía, 1980, pp.54-56). This overall picture of agricultural de-
cline contained within it important differences between the traditional, semi-capitalist hacien-
das of the highlands and the modern coastal plantations, which had high levels of mechanisation 
and served global export markets. The greater productivity levels achieved by the latter indicat-
ed that Peruvian agriculture could be improved substantially through agrarian reform and 
greater use of technology such as fertilisers, machinery, and pesticides.  iv
EXPERIMENTS WITH DEVELOPMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM 
Changing notions of “development” 
The agrarian reform programmes that proliferated across the Andes from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury onwards were driven by a desire to modernise the countryside and accelerate economic de-
velopment. As Javier Ávila Molero (2009, p.415) observes in relation to the applied anthropology 
projects that emerged during the same period, “these programmes began by understanding de-
velopment as a process of unilinear evolution valid for all the cultures and societies of the 
world.” From this perspective, rural development required the adoption of modern technology 
that was necessarily foreign in nature and a change in values and aspirations among rural popu-
lations. In short, “traditional” ways of life and cultural traditions were seen as a barrier to de-
velopment that needed to be overcome.  
As Javier Ávila (2009, p.417) notes, the problem with this concept of development was that it 
was oriented towards a series of ideals about rural life that frequently did not take into account 
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the structural economic inequalities faced by rural communities and tended to subordinate the 
practices and viewpoints of those communities in favour of “western” ideas regarding social and 
cultural change. The parliamentary debates that took place in Colombia in 1960 regarding the 
introduction of agrarian reform reveal the tendency among representatives of all political 
colours to view the rural population in terms of the “campesino other” who required guidance 
and instruction in order to modernise. The Reforma Social Agraria (Agrarian Social Reform) which 
was passed in December 1961 made provisions for state-backed producers’ associations or coop-
eratives that would provide campesinos with technical, financial and social support. The associa-
tions were designed to intervene in all aspects of peasant life and address the perceived cultural 
deficiencies of the campesino. For example, Senator Velásquez Paláu argued that the coopera-
tive would have a highly positive effect on the character of the campesino: “This will mean that 
a prosperous peasant population develops a human type of greater physical resistance, greater 
estimation of their own individual value, better awareness of their capabilities and limitations, 
with a broad sense of human solidarity, more patient and constant, better disciplined in the 
struggle for life.”   v
The central thrust of Bolivia’s 1953 agrarian reform was to provide “land for those who work it” 
by expropriating land from the latifundios and redistributing it as small plots for individual peas-
ant ownership. However, comments made by President Victor Paz Estenssoro indicate that the 
country’s peasants were viewed as passive recipients of the development agenda, rather than 
active participants in the revolution. In an interview with American historian James Wilkie in 
1966, Paz Estenssoro stated that although his regime had made land reform a priority, “we could 
not acquire, overnight, the miraculous power to bring the peasants up to the cultural level of 
the other social sectors.”  vi
This tutelary approach to rural development came into question across the Andean region during 
the 1960s and 70s because of the practical experience of implementing agrarian reform. Far 
from behaving as the passive populations imagined by government legislators, many rural com-
munities challenged official narratives and policy agendas by mobilising politically and pushing 
for the representation of their interests. In Peru, for example, the system of agricultural coop-
eratives established by the 1969 Agrarian Reform initially placed decision-making power in the 
hands of managers and technical staff. However, following trade union protests on the large sug-
ar estates in the north of the country, the government was forced to amend the law to allow 
proportional representation for different categories of worker within the administrative organs 
of the cooperatives (Zaldívar, 1974, pp.25-69). As will be discussed in greater detail below, the 
active participation of peasant and indigenous communities in processes of land reform funda-
mentally changed ideas about development in the Andean region.  
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Figure 21.1 “The land is for he who works it”. Poster produced by the local office of the  
Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (National System of Support for Social  
Mobilisation, SINAMOS), in Azángaro (Puno, Peru), c. 1975 
Courtesy of the National Library of Peru, Special Collections 
“Revolutionary” versus “technical” agrarian reform 
While all the agrarian reform programmes implemented in the Andean region were broadly dir-
ected towards alleviating rural poverty and generating economic development, there was con-
siderable variation in approach. There was also intense debate within countries over what 
agrarian reform should mean in practice. In Colombia, for example, parliamentary debates 
between November 1960 and December 1961 on the proposed Social Agrarian Reform centred on 
whether major land redistribution was necessary to break up the latifundios and improve 
campesinos’ quality of life or whether in fact sufficient change could be achieved through the 
promotion of technical reforms to agriculture and the use of colonisation to make more land 
available for agriculture (Montenegro Helfer, 2016). In the case of Bolivia, the MNR’s initial plans 
for land reform did not include a redistributive element. Rather, the government was increas-
ingly pushed into expropriating land and giving it to peasant farmers and indigenous communit-
ies to appease their demands (Dunkerley, 1984, pp.38-82). Peru’s 1969 agrarian reform was 
among the most radical in the region, expropriating large areas of land from the latifundios and 
redistributing it among peasant cooperatives at an accelerated rate. The reform was introduced 
by Juan Velasco Alvarado’s military government as a central plank of its revolution. In fact, the 
need for comprehensive agrarian reform was a key motivation for the 1968 coup in which army 
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general Velasco Alvarado and a small circle of associates seized power and expelled the demo-
cratically elected government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry. Velasco argued that Peru’s so-called 
democracy was mired in corruption and vested interests, and that meaningful social reform 
would only be achieved through a military-led revolution (Cant, 2015, pp.34-38). The agrarian 
reform was to act as a platform for broader social change, accompanied by educational reform 
and greater respect for indigenous languages and culture.  
Peru had already experienced two previous attempts at land reform, in 1962 under the Pérez 
Godoy government and again in 1964 under the Belaúnde government. Both were limited in 
scope and contained substantial loopholes that allowed the latifundios to evade expropriation. 
The 1969 Agrarian Reform Law (Legal Decree 17716) was drafted by a special commission that 
included the Minister of Agriculture and five advisors. As well as previous experiences of land 
reform, the commission drew on the growing body of research on rural issues that had emerged 
since the late 1950s in the fields of anthropology, sociology and economics. Both Peruvian 
and foreign researchers had addressed questions such as the nature of power relations in 
rural communities, systems of land tenure, the factors determining agricultural productivity and 
the prospects for social change (Matos Mar, 1958; Bouricaud, 1967; Hobsbawm, 1969). Benjamín 
Samanez Concha, one of the government advisers involved in the drafting of the reform, de-
scribed the guiding principles of the law as follows: “We wanted to carry out a structural agrari-
an reform. Not a conventional reform like that created by Law 15037 [Belaúnde’s agrarian re-
form] and like those which existed in other countries. An advanced law that proposed an agrari-
an reform that could be massive, rapid and drastic” (Del Pilar Tello, 1981, p.8).  
Unlike land reforms in Mexico and Bolivia, the Peruvian agrarian reform expropriated land ac-
cording to the priorities identified by government officials, rather than responding to petitions 
for land. That meant it could be implemented with greater speed than previous reforms, and 
under conditions that were favourable to the peasantry. Local administration of the reform was 
undertaken by the offices established in each agrarian reform zone. Once an agrarian reform 
zone had been declared, all landowners within the zone were requested to present their land 
titles for review by government administrators. Land that exceeded the “unaffectable” limit 
(variable according to geography and land type ) was expropriated. While the expropriations vii
were compulsory, landowners received payment for their land in the form of industrial bonds 
and/or cash. 
Once expropriation was complete, the process of adjudication could begin. It was 
at this point that peasants could present their case for receiving the expropriated land, which 
was often the most contentious part of the reform process (Seligmann, 1995, pp.93-104). Land 
claims were processed by newly established “Land Judges”, who were in turn accountable to a 
national Agrarian Tribunal. This new land court system was largely independent of the civil 
courts—which had tended to favour the landowners over the peasantry—and permitted oral hear-
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ings, including the use of Quechua (Seligmann, 1995, pp.62-69). In receiving the land, the 
awardees agreed to pay for it over the course of twenty years, in what became known as the 
“agrarian debt”. The primary form of adjudication was to Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción 
(Agricultural Production Cooperatives, CAPs) and Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social (Agricul-
tural Societies of Social Interest, SAIS). The Agrarian Reform Law also permitted adjudication to 
indigenous communities—which were to be renamed “peasant communities”—and groups of 
peasants who agreed to form a cooperative in the future.  In addition, peasants could receive viii
land on an individual basis in the form of a family agricultural unit. However, the government 
preferred the associative model on the grounds that it produced economies of scale and a more 
rational use of recourses. This is reflected in the fact that 65.3% of the total land adjudicated by 
the reform went to cooperatives, rather than to communities or individual peasants (Alvarez and 
Caballero, 1980, p.25).  ix
Cooperatives of one kind or another were a common feature of agrarian reforms across the An-
des: in Bolivia land was adjudicated to peasant unions (which became important vehicles of col-
lective action); in Chile peasants were organised into Centros de Reforma Agraria (Agrarian Re-
form Centres, CERA), which grouped together smaller plots of land and employed all labourers 
on an equal basis. The Velasco government saw the cooperatives created by its agrarian reform 
as a means to remodel Peruvian society: members (known as socios) gained access to health and 
social services, and had the power to vote on decisions made in the general assembly. They 
could also vote for representatives on the cooperative’s decision-making bodies, the vigilance 
and administrative councils. For many peasants, these cooperative elections were their first ex-
perience of voting. The reform was therefore not just about addressing land inequalities; it was 
designed also to promote the political inclusion of campesinos at the local and national levels 
through a network of cooperatives, agrarian leagues and a national body, the Confederación Na-
cional Agraria (National Agrarian Confederation, CNA).  
However, the revolutionary credentials of the Peruvian agrarian reform were consistently chal-
lenged by leftist organisations, which accused the Velasco government of installing a pro-capital-
ist agrarian reform that was driven by the demands of “U.S. imperialism”. For example, in a fly-
er bearing the headline “Let us crush the hacendados, let us expel the yankees,” the political 
party Vanguardia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Vanguard) claimed that the reform was designed 
to strengthen medium and small property owners and foster a capitalist mentality that would 
act as a barrier to the working class movement.  The reform was also criticised for its policy of x
compensating landowners for their land (seen as unwarranted given the poverty suffered by the 
landless), its creation of cooperatives (perceived as supplanting existing forms of political asso-
ciation and promoting authoritarian control) and the marginalisation of indigenous land claims in 
favour of the cooperative system (Cant, 2015, pp.39-41). The actions and rhetoric of radical 
leftist organisations would become a major obstacle to the successful implementation of the re-
form, which relied considerably on grassroots support. 
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Similar political struggles took place in Chile during its agrarian reform process, particularly un-
der the presidency of Salvador Allende (1970-73). In common with Peru’s agrarian reform, the 
Chilean government expropriated land from the latifundios and redistributed it to agrarian re-
form centres. These centres were to act as a vehicle for achieving the “Chilean road to social-
ism” in the countryside, offering education and social services in addition to their role in organ-
ising labour and agricultural production. However, the slow rate of expropriation meant that or-
ganisations such as the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) took matters into their own hands by 
organising land occupations and demanding that the reform be implemented. At the other end of 
the political spectrum, the agrarian reform and the grassroots mobilisation that it gave rise to 
were fiercely criticised by the country’s largest landowners’ association, the Sociedad Nacional 
de Agricultura (National Agriculture Society, SNA). It adopted a confrontational strategy towards 
Allende’s Popular Unity government and portrayed the peasant-led land occupations as the ac-
tions of dangerous terrorists, ultimately contributing to the right-wing backlash that allowed 
General Augusto Pinochet to seize power in 1973 (Robles, 2016). One of Pinochet’s first acts as 
president was to return over one third of expropriated land to former owners and dissolve nu-
merous agrarian reform centres and settlements established during the agrarian reform (Tins-
man, 2002, p.289).  
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AGRARIAN REFORM 
Limitations of reform  
Some forty years after it was introduced, opinion remains extremely divided on the Peruvian 
agrarian reform. The Velasco government came to an abrupt end in 1975, following a coup led by 
General Morales Bermúdez, whose conservative regime (1975-80) reversed many of the Velasco 
government’s reforms and began to withdraw state support for the agrarian reform. Neverthe-
less, the reform had achieved a remarkable level of land redistribution within a short space of 
time. Between 1969 and 1976 the agrarian reform transferred 7 million hectares to 1,500 collec-
tive units of various types (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980, p.274). In total some 38.8% of agricultural 
land was affected by the reform (Alvarez and Caballero, 1980, p.20). In effect, the agrarian re-
form succeeded in dismantling the hacienda system which had dominated the Peruvian country-
side for centuries. Campesinos who received land from the reform, either as individuals or as 
cooperative members, were able to pursue alternative livelihoods and educate their children to 
a degree that was previously unthinkable.  
However, the economic benefits of the reform were not equally distributed. According to Cyn-
thia McClintock (1984, pp.64-66), only about one-quarter to one-third of all farm families bene-
fitted from the reform materially and some types of farmers benefited a great deal more than 
others: the average value of the property transferred to each cooperative member was approxi-
mately 75,000 soles (about $1,900), compared to 2,000 soles ($50) per beneficiary among peas-
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ant communities. In many cases the best pasture lands were allocated for cooperative use while 
the marginal lands of lower quality were left for the use of peasant communities. This created 
tensions between peasant communities and cooperatives that erupted in the 1980s with a series 
of tomas de tierra in which peasant communities occupied cooperative lands. One of those in-
volved in the land occupations in Cusco recalled: “I saw that the campesino worked, [the coop-
erative] told him the land is yours. But in what way was it his, the land? …Just like the hacenda-
do there appeared the cooperative, the president, his directive council, and the workers were 
the ones who were exploited… So therefore absolutely nothing changed, with the cooperative.”  xi
At the macro-economic level, the cooperative model established by the Peruvian agrarian reform 
did not prove to be the engine of industrial growth envisioned by the Velasco government. Ca-
ballero and Alvarez (1980, pp.83-84) found that in 1977, cooperatives were only the majority 
producer for four crops: cotton, sorghum, grape vines and sugarcane. Non-associative agricultur-
al units of more than 5 hectares produced around half of total agricultural production and con-
trolled more than 60% of products for direct consumption and around one-third of agroindustri-
al/export products. Moreover, they found no evidence that the agrarian reform boosted produc-
tion. After the return to civilian government in 1980 many cooperatives chose to dissolve, divid-
ing up their land as smallholdings for individual ownership. These factors have frequently been 
cited (particularly by conservative critics) as evidence that that the Peruvian agrarian reform 
was a failure that did little to improve the lives of peasants. However, it is important to recog-
nise that the agrarian reform was cut short by the change in regime. It might well have achieved 
greater redistribution and economic success if it had been allowed to continue. Supporters of 
the agrarian reform also argue that it should be judged on its own terms, as an act of social jus-
tice whose objectives centred primarily on the incorporation of the peasantry into national eco-
nomic and political life, rather than agricultural productivity. In common with agrarian reforms 
in other Andean nations, the Peruvian agrarian reform opened up new opportunities for political 
participation and social movements that have in turn produced lasting political change.  
Indigenous and peasant mobilisation 
Agrarian reforms provided an important focal point around which indigenous and peasant groups 
could mobilise. As Linda Seligmann (1995) showed in the case of Cusco, peasants who had previ-
ously been marginalised by the landowning elites were able to make themselves heard and rep-
resent their interests via the Agrarian Tribunal and the process of land adjudication. Similarly, in 
Bolivia, Indian communities and peasant unions consistently petitioned the president for atten-
tion to their particular land problems and were ultimately successful in changing the terms on 
which land could be adjudicated, to recognise communal land rights alongside other types of 
land claim (Soliz Urrutia, 2014).  
The creation of peasant associations and representative organisations was a feature of several 
agrarian reforms in the region. Even in countries where land redistribution did not reach signifi-
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cant levels, peasant organisations gained an important political profile. In Colombia, for exam-
ple, the Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos de Colombia (National Association of Peas-
ant Smallholders, ANUC) was set up by President Carlos Lleras Restrepo in 1967 as a network 
through which to promote agricultural development. Although conceived in somewhat paternal-
istic terms, the organisation developed its own political path and became a centre of left-wing 
activism during the 1970s (Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987). In Peru, the congresses of the government-
sponsored CNA (National Agrarian Confederation) and the independent Confederación de 
Campesinos del Perú (Peasant Confederation of Peru, CCP) encouraged the development of 
peasant networks and strengthened peasants’ ability to represent their own interests. Whereas 
critics of the agrarian reform portray the agricultural cooperatives as a model imposed from 
above that was rejected by the peasantry, my interviews with former cooperative members indi-
cate that the cooperatives provided an important basis for peasant-led development. For exam-
ple, even after state support for the cooperatives had been withdrawn in the 1980s, the Cooper-
ativa Agraria de Producción Negri Ulloa in Piura continued to develop new systems of member 
participation and collectivised the marketing of produce, despite opposition from the private 
sector (Cant, 2015, pp.129-30). 
As well as increasing the profile of peasant activism on rural issues, the Peruvian agrarian reform 
produced a wider shift in the citizenship rights afforded to campesinos. This was largely due to 
the political terms in which the reform was conceived and implemented. Government propagan-
da stressed the idea that the reform heralded the liberation of the campesinos from the hacien-
da system and the chance to participate actively in local and national politics. Within the coop-
eratives, peasants were encouraged to take part in general meetings and take up positions with-
in the administrative councils. Both the 1972 education reform and government-sponsored edu-
cation programmes within the cooperatives aimed to increase literacy among peasants and es-
tablish a more inclusive education system. Whereas low levels of education among the peasantry 
had previously been used as an argument for delaying the transfer of land, the Velasco govern-
ment took the view that it was necessary to proceed with fundamental structural change and fill 
the educational gaps as required. If one waited until the population had been educated to the 
required extent, major change might never happen. Alongside government-led training pro-
grammes, cooperatives were encouraged to set up their own education committees and organise 
educational initiatives for their members (Cant, 2015, pp. 87-132). 
The Peruvian government’s attention to the progress of the agrarian reform meant that rural is-
sues consistently featured in the national media, while the government also invested in innova-
tive projects such as peasant-led radio programmes and the first Quechua language national 
newspaper. As debates over the implementation of the agrarian reform at the local level intensi-
fied, the government and left-wing activists competed for peasant support and viewed the peas-
antry as a significant political base. An important consequence of the public profile achieved by 
peasants during the agrarian reform was that when Peru returned to democratic rule in 1980, 
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the country’s illiterate population—the vast majority of whom were peasants—were granted the 
right to vote in national elections for the first time. The political engagement demonstrated by 
peasants during the course of the agrarian reform made it difficult to return to the status quo 
ante, in which national politics were dominated by the landowning elites and peasants were de-
nied suffrage. 
The demise of agrarian reform programmes and the ascendancy of neoliberalism across Latin 
America since the late 1970s pose new questions about the relationship between agriculture and 
development. Policy agendas promoted by figures such as President Alberto Fujimori in Peru 
(1990-2000) and President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia (1993-97; 2002-03) led to severe 
cuts in state spending and the promotion of big business as “wealth generators” across all eco-
nomic sectors. As part of this trend, Peru has seen dramatic increases in the concentration of 
land ownership since the early 1990s. This corresponds to a combination of factors: the with-
drawal of constitutional protections for land owned by peasant communities (previously defined 
as inalienable and nontransferable to third parties); the limited availability of credit facilities 
for small landowners; and, neoliberal economic policies that provide favourable conditions for 
large agroindustrial enterprises (lower taxes, reduced labour protections, international trade 
agreements). As Fernando Eguren (2014) notes, the concentration of land ownership has been 
particularly marked in the productive coastal areas that were once at the centre of Velasco’s 
agrarian reform. In 2012 some 30 percent of coastal agricultural land was directly controlled by 
18 conglomerates and 20 independent companies, each of which owned more than 1,000 
hectares. This figure was set to rise to 40% by the end of the decade (Eguren, 2014, p.179). At 
the same time, the dissolution of the agricultural cooperatives and the decline of agricultural 
trade unions has placed small landowners in a precarious economic position, unable to compete 
with large agricultural enterprises and often forced to sell their produce to intermediary compa-
nies at below-market rates (Eguren, 2014, pp.182-5). Social movements have emerged to chal-
lenge the narrative of economic growth powered by big business, highlighting the long-term en-
vironmental threats posed by industrialised agriculture and the extractive industries. However, 
as Eguren (2014, p.189) comments, “The social movements, which are episodic and decen-
tralised, although occasionally very intense, have not managed to articulate themselves nor con-
struct an alternative discourse capable of orienting vast sectors of the population that, despite 
the sustained economic growth, or perhaps because of it, feel that they continue to be excluded 
from its benefits.” 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by describing the land problem that affected the whole of the Andean region 
to varying degrees: huge inequalities in access to land that resulted in the latifundio/minifundio 
complex. A legacy of the hacienda system that grew up during the colonial era, the latifundio/
minifundio complex meant that a small proportion of landowners controlled vast areas of terri-
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tory and were able to dictate the terms of labour, trade and water access for subsistence farm-
ers and hacienda workers. By the mid-twentieth century this situation was being challenged as 
both socially unjust and economically backward; agrarian reforms that sought to modernise 
property relations and agricultural methods were given strong support by the U.S. government 
via the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, the growth in communist insurgency and the suc-
cess of the Cuban Revolution highlighted the need to redistribute land and wealth to minimise 
the appeal of communism among rural communities. The agrarian reforms introduced in differ-
ent Andean countries from the early 1950s onwards typically included some element of land re-
distribution, technical assistance for agriculturalists and the creation of cooperatives or collec-
tive bodies to represent peasants’ interests. Agrarian reforms nevertheless varied considerably in 
the speed and manner in which they were implemented, and their political orientation. While 
Bolivia’s Víctor Paz Estenssoro described his government’s agrarian reform as a means of bringing 
peasants up to the same cultural level as the urban population, Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado de-
clared his agrarian reform was a historic moment in which peasants would throw off the legacy 
of centuries of oppression and take a leading role in the country’s economic development.  
Andean agrarian reforms often reflected a tutelary approach to development that saw peasants 
as passive recipients of state assistance, who needed to be modernised through education and 
cultural change. However, the legal processes and political contexts created as part of agrarian 
reform enabled peasant movements to chart their own independent course, often challenging 
the assumptions that underpinned “western” development models. In the case of Peru, the op-
tion to participate in cooperative management and national peasant organisations helped propel 
a new generation of peasant leaders into the public sphere. They continued to shape Peruvian 
politics long after the collapse of the agrarian reform. While opinion remains divided on whether 
agrarian reform worked as a response to land inequalities, it had an undeniable impact in dis-
mantling the hacienda system and raising the profile of rural communities within national politi-
cal discourse.  
The current political and economic climate presents a series of new challenges, such as the posi-
tion of small agricultural producers in an increasingly globalised economy, the balance between 
agricultural productivity and biodiversity, and the expansion of extractive industries that prom-
ise immense wealth but which often threaten the lives and livelihoods of peasant communities. 
Rural populations across the Andean region are once again being forced to mobilise in order to 
articulate their own vision of agricultural development and defend their interests at local, na-
tional and international levels. 
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 Contract signed by Benjamín de La Torre (landlord) and Francisco Micaura (tenant), 1 January i
1907, reproduced in CENCIRA, 1972.
 All translations from Spanish to English are the author’s own.ii
 “La Reforma Agraria es Urgente”, La Prensa, 9 May 1962, p.8.iii
 In reality, this idea turned out to rely on a series of false assumptions about the transferability iv
of “modern” agricultural techniques and did not give due consideration to the diversity of ten-
ure, labour conditions and ecologies in different areas of the country. See Harding, 1974; Guil-
let, 1979; Scott, 1979.
 Senado de la República, Historia de las Leyes, I:465 and 468. Cited in Montenegro Helfer, 2016, v
p.41.
 Wilkie, J., 1974. Measuring Land Reform. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, University vi
of California, p.28, cited in Soliz Urrutia, 2014, p.87.
 The limit was 200 hectares on the coast and between 5 and 50 hectares in the sierra. See D.L. vii
17716, title 3, Chapter 1.
  See D.L 17716, Title 6, Art. 77 and Title X, Art. 117.viii
 Note that this figure refers to all types of land and does not take into account degrees of irriix -
gation etc.
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